Marshall's Interest in General Equilibrium Analysis
Marshall's interest in general equilibrium is more than simply a conjecture of mine. In Note 20 (Note 21 of 2-9th edition) of Principles of Economics, Alfred Marshall discusses the issues of general equilibrium in his "bird's eye view of joint demand, composite demand, joint and composite supply when all arise together." In discussing this note in a letter to J.B.
Clarke, Marshall (1908) comments that "my whole life has been and will be given to presenting in realistic form as much as I can of my Note 21. If I live to complete my scheme fairly well, people will, I think, realize that it has unity and individuality."
Consistent with this view we can find discussions of interrelationships among markets in his Principles. (See, for example, p. 711.) But what those discussions present are observations of realities, not analytics. As I will argue below, Marshall used the real world observations as a guide to the interrelationship among markets because he believed that an analytic understanding of these interrelationships was beyond the mathematical specifications of the time. Given that belief, it is not surprising that 
Why Marshall Shied Away from Developing a Formal General Equilibrium Model
Why did Marshal focus his analysis on partial equilibrium and not formally develop his conception of general equilibrium? One possible explanation is that he was not the mathematician or conceptualizer that
Walras was, and that he knew he was incapable of formally specifying a general equilibrium system. I think it is correct that he felt incapable of specifying a meaningful formal general equilibrium system, but not because he was unable to formulate a system such as Walras's. One reason I believe this is that Marshall was a trained mathematician, and by most accounts, a good one. He understood simultaneous equations and had the ability to solve systems of simultaneous equations. His Note 21 summarizes the essence of a broad conception of general equilibrium better than any other one page written on the subject.
I believe the reason Marshall didn't formally analyze general
equilibrium issues is that he demanded intuitive correspondence between math and his understanding of the economy. When that correspondence was
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5 not present, the math was irrelevant; such irrelevant math should be discarded. 3 Marshall's recognition of the analytic intractability of the general equilibrium problem, given the math available to him, and his desire for concreteness in his economics, led him to shy away from abstract specifications of general equilibrium. Leon Walras, meanwhile, had less aversion to abstraction devoid of intuitive correspondence with reality, and trod where others would not go. Unfortunately, it was a path that others followed, and Walras's version of the general equilibrium system has become the foundation of modern 20th century economics, while Marshallian general equilibrium economics never developed. 4 Thus, when Paul Samuelson developed the mathmatical foundations of modern economics, (Samuelson, 1 ) , he developed them around Walrasian economics. Similarly when the microfoundations to macro were developed, they were developed along Walrasian general equilibrium lines.
To Marshall, once one mastered the intuition of the general equilibrium reasoning, going through formal specification in the way Walras did was laborious but trivial. Such an exercise was worth one page in an appendix in the Principles. Anyone with reasonable training in math could work out a system of general interrelated equations. Marshall did not do so because it would not add much to our understanding, and would violate the law of significant digits, since such a specification would be incomplete. The problem was the interrelation between dynamic and static issues; such interrelationships clearly existed and, in Marshall's mind, invalidated any static analytic conclusion at which one could arrive. Marshall followed the maxim: better to be ambiguous and relevant than precise and irrelevant.
For example, Donald argues that while this view of Walras follows from the fourth edition of the Elements, the version most English speaking economists are familiar with (since that was the version translated), in earlier versions there was a different, and what Walker believes is a more meaningful system--one that is closer to the system I am attributing to Marshall, and that elsewhere (Colander 1995 Marshall introduced his period analysis with a market period, short period, and long period. As Axel Leijonhufvud points out, this period approach to studying the adjustment of potentially complex non-linear systems was the type of approach physicists were using in studying problems involving non-linear dynamics. It was known as adiabatic transformations in the older thermodynamics literature. (Leijonhufvud 1995.) My point is not that Marshall's treatment of such issues was satisfactory; it had serious problems, and Marshall knew it. For example, he wrote that his treatment of time and the various runs was the weakest element of his analysis. (Marshall, 1908) My point is that Marshall recognized that these issues were of fundamental importance, and that the then available mathematics was insufficient even to begin to handle those problems. Since such complicated issues were central to understanding the workings of the aggregate economy, why formulate formal models that deviated so much from observations? Only now, in the 1990s, are economists becoming sufficiently familiar with the math relevant to such situationsnon-linear dynamics, chaotics and complexity-to start to apply them in their models.
A second reason Marshall did not formally specify his general equilibrium system was that he was a cautious man; for example, although he had worked out the central elements of partial equilibrium supply and demand analysis, and his foundations of neoclassical economics, in the 1870s
when Menger and Jevons were espousing their claims, he did not publish them until the 1890s-twenty years later. Keynes, reflecting on Marshall's cautious nature writes: "Jevons saw the kettle boil and cried out with the delighted voice of a child; Marshall too had seen the kettle boil and sat down silently to build an engine." (Keynes 1956 .) Marshall recognized that the jump to general equilibrium was, by contrast to the jump to partial equilibrium, a gigantic leap worthy of at least a 100-year wait, if partial equilibrium took a 20-year wait.
The Marshallian General Equilibrium System
I admire Marshall, but I do not share his cautiousness. I have more the personality, and the mathematical ability, of Walras. Moreover, mathematics has developed enormously since the late 1800s; work in complexity theory, non-linear dynamics, chaos theory, and the developments in computers has given us tools needed to gain more understanding of complex systems-tools This Marshallian fudge involves a substantive role of existing institutions and non-market coordinating mechanisms in providing the coordination that is assumed in Walras. These institutions provide a framework of coordination, but they also provide systemic constraints on the decision making of individuals. Any analysis of individual decision making must take into account these systemic constraints. An institution-less economy would, in this Marshallian sense, be unstable; it would be 6 There are two reasons why I believe Marshall could not accept the Walrasian fudge. The first is that he did not believe that general equilibrium issues could be reasonably dealt with using a set of timeless interrelated simultaneous equations because individuals do not have the capabilities to process the information necessary to deal with such a system. The second is that if people did have the capabilities to deal with general equilibrium analysis, the result would have been chaos since there were too many options and strategic interdependencies.
characterized by anarchy and chaos. 7 Because these restrictions embodied in institutions provide the stability necessary to prevent chaos, such restrictions must be included in the analysis. Institutions provide stability, but they also provide restrictions on individual actions. You cannot assume stability without institutions.
The Marshallian fudge follows from insights we get from the analysis of complex systems. Inevitably those complex systems are not organized with a single system of simultaneous equations; instead they are organized with hierarchical structures that take advantage of the computational abilities of the various levels. A metaphor for this approach is the way a computer is organized. It has an operating system, software, and nested software.
Individuals operating at lower levels do not understand the workings of the entire computer; they accept the rationality of their subsystem.
The essence of my proposed Marshallian general equilibrium analysis is that it sees the interaction among sectors as being solved in a sequential manner in which nested institutions of various longevities are accepted by some set of individual decision makers. These institutions limit instability with a corridor around existing situations. In normal times, individual optimization is conducted given the multiple leveled constraints, but every so often, perhaps because of a large autonomous shock, or simply spontaneous 7 The irony of Marshall's general equilibrium system is that if it is taken seriously, it undermines the one contribution that he is known for--partial equilibrium, because what is now known as partial equilibrium does not take into account the constraints imposed on individual decision makers by general equilibrium institutions.
dissatisfaction, individuals challenge these constraints; aggregate stability is lost, and new institutional structures, and new constraints, emerge.
Marshallian rationality is fundamentally different than Walrasian rationality, and its role in the system is different. Decisions are made sequentially, and certain decisions, once made, become operating data for lower level systems. Marshallian rationality can mean many different things depending on what level one is operating at. For most decisions the institutions, and the constraints they impose on individuals' decisions, are the central feature of fixity in the Marshallian general equilibrium system, and the shorter the run, the more institutions are assumed fixed.
Marshallian rationality is defined locally, not globally. 8 In fact, Marshallian systemic stability depends on individuals not exhibiting global rationality.
People's limitations make it possible for institutions to develop; their bounded rationality creates a stability that could not exist if everyone pushed economic maximization to the limit.
But this Marshallian systemic stability is fragile; the economy is always bordering on chaos, and when a sufficient number of individuals try to take advantage of the niches in the system left by institutions-i.e., follow economic rather than social restrictions-the institutions fail, stability is lost, and a new set of institutions must be found to provide the necessary stability.
In short, the system takes advantage of people's cost of computing and, whenever, possible, chooses an institution that provides stability.
Notice the difference between the Marshallian and Walrasian conception of economically rational actor. In the Walrasian conception the ultra rational economic actor drives the system to equilibrium and serves a useful purpose. In the Marshallian system such ultra-rational economic actors can destroy the system by destroying the institutions that give it stability.
A Mathematical Specification of Marshall's General Equilibrium System
Mathematically, Marshall's jump to general equilibrium would not be a single jump, but rather a set of jumps; these intermediate jumps complicate
the mathematics of general equilibrium enormously. It involves specifying all decisions as a system of multiple nested equations.
y=f(g(h(k(l(x))))))
One could argue that such a layered problem could be reduced to a Walrasian system by simply reducing this equation into a composite function: 
Some Implications of the Marshallian Approach
There are many implications of this Marshallian approach to general equilibrium for the way we do economics in the 1990s. For example, consider the justification for the dynamics. In Walrasian economics one must search for a microfoundation for such dynamics. Why don't individuals allow prices to fluctuate, since that would be optimal? In Marshallian general equilibrium there is no such presumption, and thus the search for a contextless micro foundations, a search that characterizes much of modern macro, is meaningless. If institutions exhibit relatively fixed nominal prices, such fixity is a macro systemic constraint that is imposed by institutional requirements.
A second, related, issue concerns optimality of the market system.
Since multiple institutions can be chosen, there is no presumption of systemic optimality of a market system. Any conclusion about systemic optimality follows only from a consideration of comparative institutions. There is no assurance that the market system coordinates better than other systems. If it does, this is an observable phenomenon, not a deduced fact. In fact, in the Marshallian system the concept "market" has no meaning without a specification of the institutions that make that market feasible.
In the long run all interactions are possible, but like a computer without an operating system, the long run institutional structure is extremely user unfriendly. Changes in that institutional structure are made with great trouble. There is no omnipotent being choosing the best system, but, instead, there are individuals working within the institutional structure they have. Bill Gates said that God created the world in seven days, but He didn't have an installed user base. It is not simply a single operating system that our economy has, but is instead a multiple layered system of nested software, and that nested system makes change, and any analysis of low level decisions, extraordinarily complicated.
As a final example of where Marshallian general equilibrium theory gives one a fundamentally different view of economic reality than does Walrasian general equilibrium, let me consider a specific aspect of economics, one that has been central to distinguishing different schools of economics: the theory of distribution. In the Walrasian approach income distribution is determined by marginal productivity. Assuming a linear homogeneous production function, one has a complete theory of distribution. This theory of marginal productivity is so built into our way of thinking that it is often not questioned. Marshall, however, had serious reservations about it, and understanding Marshallian general equilibrium explains why. In the Marshallian general equilibrium approach, marginal productivity theory influences distribution, but it is in no way a theory of distribution. You can see Marshall's view where he writes:
This doctrine (of marginal productivity) has sometimes been put forward as a theory of wages. But there is no valid ground for any such pretension. The doctrine that the earnings of a worker tend to be equal to the net product of his work has by itself no real meaning; since in order to estimate net product, we have to take for granted all the expenses of production of the commodity on which he works, other than his own wages.
But though this objection is valid against a claim that it contains a theory of wages; it is not valid against a claim that the doctrine throws into clear sight the action of one of the causes that govern wages. (Principles p. 519.)
The problem Marshall had with marginal productivity theory is that institutions have significant effects on distribution, and thus it is simply wrong to talk about marginal productivity independent of institutions' effect on income distribution. In game theoretic terms the argument is that to get an acceptance of institutions, side deals must be made among participants which place constraints on individuals and change the nature of equilibrium.
Let me give an example. Say you have two types of individuals: big heads and big arms. Say also that there are three possible production techniques that are possible. Two of these production techniques require acquiescence among individuals; these two techniques are equally efficient in the sense that when all workers are used, 100 units of output is forthcoming from both techniques. Technique A, however, gives a MP of 3/4 to big arms and 1/4 to big heads, while Technique B gives a MP of 3/4 to big heads and 1/4 to big arms. Techniques A and B require acceptance from both groups; if no agreement is reached, Technique C must be used, which gives a MP of 1/2 for both, but which has a total output of only 40.
Clearly each group will be better off with choosing either Technique A In Walrasian economics such side payments resulting from prior deals cannot be considered; there is no history and no institutions. In Marshallian economics, to have a theory of distribution one requires both a theory of history and a theory of institutions. In Marshallian economics, to judge any outcome, it is not enough to look at marginal productivities at a point in time;
production has a social and historical component, and a particular result can only be interpreted in its historical and social context. Walrasians make the implicit assumptions that all these complications do not matter-that the time inconsistency problem is not dealt with by individuals, and that ,somehow, all institutions are simply plopped down upon individuals.
Walrasian marginal productivity distribution theory ignores all that;
Marshallian general equilibrium distribution theory could not, and therefore is much more complicated.
Conclusion: A Reversal of Samuelson's Dictum
There is much more to be said about Marshallian general equilibrium, The third point I will argue in this paper is that Marshall's general equilibrium will replace Walrasian general equilibrium in the next decade.
Thus, the motto of the 21st century will be:
Marshall is for real mathematicians and liberal arts professors; Walras is for pseudo mathematicians which includes many of the professors at universities. Samuelson. It argues that that paralyzing effect was a good thing-necessary because the mathematics available at the time were not up to the task of considering issues of general equilibrium in the complexity that they needed to be considered. It argues that the misplaced precision of Leon Walras's general equilibrium analysis sent the best brains in the profession on a wild goose chase that reduced, as opposed to increased, our knowledge of economic phenomena. Only now in the 1990s, with new developments in mathematics and computers, are we even beginning to get to a level of mathematics where we might be able to shed some light on general equilibrium issues through analytic means. 
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